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Abstract 
This article addresses the question of how the financial and economic crisis that hit the US in 
the late 2000s impacted immigration policies. We find that the crisis has not significantly 
changed dynamics. Instead, it has highlighted and aggravated persisting trends. Drawing on 
Kingdon’s multiple streams model and combining it with the notion of two-level games, we 
find that while the policy stream and the problem stream would call for both restrictive and 
liberalising changes, the political stream impedes change: The fact that Congress has been 
divided for a long time over Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) impedes any 
restrictive or liberalising changes. With problems resulting from current policies being 
intensified through the global economic crisis, however, actors favouring either restrictive or 
liberal policy change look for alternative venues to pursue their policy aims. Through 
legislative changes on the state level or via executive orders by the president, policies can be 
changed on a lower level without CIR.  
 
Keywords: deadlock, economic crisis, immigration policies, multiple streams, USA, venue-
shopping 
 
1. Introduction 
The global economic and financial crisis since 2008 has proved to be a major challenge for 
the Western world. It resulted in both a rise in unemployment rates and a decrease in public 
spending in many European countries and the United States (US).  
External shocks such as the economic crises have been found to substantially impact 
immigration policies in the past. Given the rise in unemployment and the decreased demand 
on the labour force, crises can be expected to produce ʻa climate conducive to a restrictive 
regimeʼ (Beets and Willekens 2009, 6; Newton 2008, 60). Cases in point are the Depression 
of 1920/21 in the US and the economic downturn following the oil crisis in the 1970s, both of 
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which led to the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies (Hatton and 
Williamson 2009). Yet at the same time, a crisis also makes more pronounced the hardships 
of undocumented immigrants that have no access to social benefits and thus suffer 
significantly when losing their occupation. Increased restriction of labour migration, 
moreover, can lead to migrants seeking access via humanitarian channels for refugee 
protection or family reunification (Czaika and De Haas 2013).  
The recent crisis has been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression by the International Monetary Fund (The Guardian, 10 April, 2008) and can thus 
be expected to have significantly impacted immigration policies in the US, as the US was hit 
particularly hard by the crisis (Huffington Post, 21 June, 2012; The Atlantic, 20 March, 2013). 
For instance, the US faced a substantial rise in unemployment and a GDP decrease in the 
crisis years from 2008 to 2012. This article aims at answering the question of how and to what 
extent the global economic crisis has impacted US immigration policies and politics.  
We find that while there is no policy change induced by Congress, substantive changes 
at the state levels and through presidential Executive Orders can be observed. While policy 
change is blocked through deadlock in Congress, pressures from their constituencies for either 
liberal or restrictive changes encourage politicians to search for alternative venues to realise 
their policy aims. Actors interviewed for this study substantiate the claim that the crisis had an 
accelerating impact on policy change at levels other than Congress. We argue that this 
situation can be explained based on a combination of both venue-shopping as introduced by 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and the multiple streams model suggested by Kingdon (1995). 
While both the policy stream (i.e. policy ideas that are present among politicians and experts) 
and the problem stream (i.e. the non-functionality of the current immigration system) would 
call for change, the political situation of deadlock in Congress impedes change. The reason 
for impeded change is that both actors with liberal preferences and actors with restrictive 
preferences present in the Congress rather have incentives for defection than cooperation on 
the issue matter, as defection results in more favourable policy outcomes for each of them. 
They are more willing to accept the absence of the policy change they desire than they are 
willing to adopt changes to the status quo based on the policy preferences of their adversaries. 
Thus, proponents of restrictive change, such as political actors from (mainly Republican 
governed) US states that are affected disproportionately by undocumented immigration, foster 
restrictive change on the local level and adopt policy aiming at immigration control 
enforcement that has so far been blocked in Congress (Steil and Vasi 2014; Jones and Chou 
2014). In contrast, examples for liberal change are the executive orders launched by President 
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Obama aiming at temporary relief from deportation as well as the right to apply for work 
permits for certain undocumented immigrants.  
With this study we aim to contribute to the wider debate on whether external shocks 
entail either restrictive or liberalising policy change. Our core finding is that while external 
shocks create pressures for change, these pressures need to be taken up by political actors in 
order to be transformed into actual policy change. Where change does not happen, pressures 
for change look for alternative venues and entail a politicisation of the issue. This study is 
based on an analysis of literature as well as policy documents on a number of decisions that 
have been made in the immigration policy area in the US between 2008 and 2012. In addition, 
we conducted 15 interviews in Fall 2012, at the height of the economic crisis, in which 
collective actors, such as unions and employers, but also politicians and experts from think 
tanks, elaborated on what they considered viable policies in times of crisis. 
 
2. Multiple Streams and Venue-Shopping as a theoretical framework to study policy 
change in times of crisis 
We aim at explaining the impact of the crisis on US immigration policies by drawing on 
Kingdon’s multiple streams approach and combining it with the venue-shopping theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993). According to Kingdon (1995), policy change can be explained 
by a convergence of the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. 
Analogously, the lack of change is based on an absence of this convergence. In line with 
Kingdon, the problem stream means the issue or the policy problem to be addressed. The 
policy stream covers the policy ideas that aim at its solution. The politics stream is the 
institutional setting and the political actors involved. In this article, we argue that the absence 
of a political stream favourable to change can account for the policy deadlock that we observe 
in US immigration politics in Congress. Moreover, we argue that the absence of such a 
favourable political stream can be best explained by drawing on the deadlock game in game 
theory. Following this model, non-cooperation is most beneficial to all actors involved, both 
individually and collectively, which eventually leads to policy stasis. Yet, given the immense 
pressures for change by their constituencies, which were amplified through the economic 
crisis, we argue that proponents of change look for alternative venues to pursue their aims. 
Thus, we contribute to the empirically rich body of literature on policy stasis in the US 
(Mansbridge and Martin 2013; McCarthy 2007) by adding an as of yet missing theoretical 
explanation for this state of affairs.  
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According to the multiple streams model, the policy stream concerns policy ideas that 
are constantly around in what Kingdon calls the ʻpolicy primeval soupʼ (Kingdon 1995, 116). 
These policy ideas are usually based on different preferences. While some actors might be 
more concerned about immigrants’ effective access to rights, others might favour a limitation 
of immigration levels or aim at more selectivity in immigrant admission. Based on these 
preferences, actors build ideas of both causal relationships (i.e. about what is) and what could 
be policy responses to tackle problems. The policy ideas thus are solutions which they can sell 
to decision-makers. Yet, crucial events are needed for these policy ideas to get noticed and 
gain political weight (Kingdon 1995, 113). In fact, dissent about the number, nature and 
national origin of desirable immigration is a constant feature of the US debate (Zolberg 2008 
[2006]). At the same time, immigrants are depicted as ʻvillainous invadersʼ and ʻheroic 
foundersʼ (Newton 2008, 1). Thus, a crisis entailing a rise in numbers of unemployment can 
arguably help promoters of restriction of immigration gain ground (Newton 2008, 60). These 
could use the event to argue for a cut in immigration to ensure a stronger protection of 
national workers. Simultaneously, a crisis highlights the hardship undergone by 
undocumented immigrants as their socio-structural position makes them especially vulnerable 
to economic slumps (Tilly 2011; Papademetriou and Terrazas 2010). Yet, to implement 
restrictive or liberalising policy changes, the political stream has to come in as well. The 
political stream comprises things such as ʻthe public mood, pressure group campaigns, 
election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of 
administrationʼ (Kingdon 1995, 145). For instance, it has been argued that the increasing 
number of Latino voters puts pressure on the Democrats to introduce liberalising changes for 
the legalisation of their as of yet ‘illegal’ family and friends. In 2005, 84% of the Latino 
population supported the legalisation through the so-called ‘path to citizenship’ (Suro 2005, 
10). We assert that it is particularly the political stream which impedes change in Congress 
through deadlock. According to game theory, actors involved in a deadlock game benefit 
rather from defection than from cooperation. In this sense the game is a zero sum game. Each 
actor would benefit most in case of their own defection and the cooperation of the other actor. 
Yet, the second best outcome for actors would be that both of them defect. The least 
beneficial outcome for either of them would be obviously their own cooperation and the 
defection of the other actor. Thus, an outcome where both of them defect is highly likely.  
However, with the crisis, the problem stream that supports the preferences of 
proponents of both liberal and restrictive change swells and their policy ideas face a rising 
demand with the electorate, at least in some highly affected states (Fetzer 2006). Thus, with 
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deadlock in Congress, politicians need to look for alternative political venues (Baumgartner 
and Jones 1993) to pursue their aims and satisfy their constituencies. Our time of observation 
(2008-2012) spans, at least partly, from the 110
th
 (2007-2009) to the 112
th
 Congress (2011-
2013). During the 110
th
 Congress under the Bush administration, the House of 
Representatives as well as the Senate had a Democrat majority.
2
 In the 111
th
 Congress, 
Obama was presiding over a Democrat majority in the House and Senate. Eventually, 
Republicans gained the majority in the House of Representatives in the 112
th
 Congress, 
however, still under Obama administration. Generally, immigration politics in the US is 
divisive and politicians do not necessarily hold uniform positions that reflect a party platform 
(Illias, Fenelly, and Federico 2008: 748). On specific issues, however, a partisan divide has 
become visible. Republicans more often prefer restrictive policies, particularly as regards 
border enforcement (Fetzer 2006; Milner and Tingley 2008). Democrats, on the other hand, 
have stronger preferences for the legalisation of undocumented immigrants (Lopez and 
Minushkin 2008, Boyer 2012, 2-3).  
We argue that the situation of deadlock in Congress in combination with the crisis 
makes policy-makers particularly susceptible to the dynamics of venue-shopping. While US 
policy-makers have already passed immigration policies in alternative venues before the 
beginning of the crisis, we argue that dynamics of venue-shopping in this area have 
intensified with the crisis.  
Republicans searched for venues where they did not encounter liberal veto players. The 
Democrats could circumvent restrictive veto players through presidential Executive Orders, 
which the president was able to pass without any interference of the opposing party in 
Congress. How the crisis promoted this search for alternative venues can be shown by 
applying the multiple stream model to US immigration politics.  
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3. The Problem Stream: An ineffective immigration system in times of economic 
crisis 
The US immigration system in the 2010s is widely acknowledged as dysfunctional. Not only 
has President Obama characterised the system as ʻbrokenʼ3, but there is also consensus in 
scholarly debates that the current status quo is ʻbad for migrants, employers and the national 
interestʼ (Martin 2011a, 24). This is especially due to high hurdles immigrants face. Unless 
someone has family-ties to US citizens, it is quite difficult to immigrate to the US. Visa 
streams for high- and low-skilled immigrants are criticised as they are overly complex and do 
not match business demands adequately (Hansen 2009, 11-13; Hanson 2009, 4). In addition, a 
large number of undocumented immigrants entered the country in the past two decades, of 
which some moved to states that did not previously have experiences with immigration 
(Jones-Correa 2012, 4)
4
. The latest estimates from January 2012 suggest an overall number of 
11.4 million undocumented immigrants residing in the US, with a share of 59% being of 
Mexican origin (Baker and Rytina 2013). It is estimated that 30-45% of the unauthorised 
population legally entered the country but then overstayed their visa (Hanson 2009, 3; Pew 
2006).
5
 The economic crisis hit legal and, in particular, undocumented immigrants most 
severely, as sectors in which many immigrants had previously found employment (i.e. 
construction, retail and food) were highly affected by the economic downturn (Papademetriou 
and Terrazas 2010, 44-46; Tilly 2011, 679; Green and Winters 2010: 1068). Scholars, 
moreover, found that the economic crisis led to stagnating numbers in the (estimated) 
population of undocumented immigrants or even decreasing undocumented immigration 
(Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2012, 1).  
The last major legislative reforms addressing the shortcomings of the US immigration 
system were the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the Immigration Act 
of 1990 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 
1996 (Schain 2012, 210-215; Migration Policy Institute 2013). While IRCA tried to tackle the 
situation of a growing population of undocumented immigrants with amnesty and employer 
sanctions, the Immigration Act of 1990 aimed especially to raise the numbers of skilled 
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workers through the creation of the H-1B visa program (Schain 2012, 210-215, 104 Stat. 
4978, §205). In addition, the IIRIRA combined greater border enforcement with a cut in 
social security benefits for immigrants (i.e. Social Security Federal public benefits, 110, Stat. 
3009; see also Newton 2008, 53-63). Moreover, the IIRIRA enabled ʻlocal and state police 
[…] to enforce federal immigration lawʼ (Varsanyi 2010, 2) under provision 287(g). This is 
remarkable paradigm shift since immigration enforcement was an exclusive federal 
competence with states having ʻvirtually no role in the construction or enforcement of 
immigration lawʼ (Wishnie 2002, 285)6. Nevertheless, IRCA was unsuccessful in diminishing 
the inflow of undocumented migrants and the Immigration Act of 1990 played its part in 
increasing the complexity of the immigration system (Schain 2012, 213; Martin 2011b, 80). 
Not surprisingly, the widely acknowledged problems of the current US immigration policies 
also influence public opinion. The Pew Research Center (2013, 2) found that 75% of the 
respondents see the need for at least major changes in the US immigration system. More 
precisely, the same survey observed that while three-fourths of the respondents want a 
possibility for undocumented immigrants to stay legally (73%) and think that the government 
can do more to reduce undocumented immigration (a lot more: 53%; somewhat more: 30%), 
there is little consensus on whether to increase or reduce legal immigration (increase: 25%, 
decrease: 36%).  
In sum, the ‘problem stream’ of US immigration policies is that the immigration system 
is considered dysfunctional by the majority of policy-makers involved. Both proponents of 
restriction (e.g. in the areas of border protection or family immigration) and liberalisation (e.g. 
concerning legalisation of immigrants already in the country or supporters of increased 
immigration by labour) do not benefit from the system as it is. In the following section we 
will show that while all actors agreed that the immigration system needed to be reformed, the 
policy ideas to fix the broken system varied significantly between the actors. 
 
4. The Policy Stream: Ideas for the reform of an ineffective immigration policy 
This section demonstrates that the comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) comprises a set 
of major ideas for reinvigorating the effectiveness of US immigration policy. According to 
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Kingdon, policy ideas need to be on the floor already for actors to take them up and translate 
them into policy change. We will show how actors’ preferences either coincided or collided 
with the CIR in times of economic crisis. Against the background of the picture drawn in the 
previous section, CIR – including border enforcement, regularisation of the undocumented 
and a guest worker scheme – becomes a compelling solution to the problems of the US 
immigration system. Since the 2000s, various forms of CIR have been debated in the US (for 
a history of proposed CIRs cf. Rosenblum 2011). Moreover, two presidents supported a CIR, 
although until now with little effect (Hanson 2009, 3). ‘Comprehensive immigration reform’ 
not only entails the promise of fixing an ineffective immigration policy, but also insinuates 
that actors would be more willing to agree on a package deal rather than individual policy. 
Comprehensiveness means that every major stakeholder’s primary interest would be achieved, 
while at the same time the adoption of all policies would entail compromises on actors’ 
positions (Freeman 2009, 65-69; Rosenblum 2011, 10-13). Put differently, every stakeholder 
receives something, while having to give in on other issues. CIRs in the past entailed – in 
different compositions - ʻincreased enforcement, a guest worker scheme and a path to 
legalizationʼ (Freeman 2009, 69; Rosenblum 2011, 1). These three elements of immigration 
reform are key areas of US immigration policy. A CIR would tackle all of these policy areas. 
First, the call for increased enforcement touches upon border control, primarily at the southern 
US border, and stepping up internal control measures by means of ID and status checks at the 
work place (ʻE-verifyʼ) as well as in public places. Second, the expansion of guest worker 
schemes is meant to broaden the legal channel for the temporal demand for low- and highly-
skilled labour. Such measures accommodate the demands of industry and business for a 
steady supply of labour. Third, with legalisation the estimated ten to twelve million 
undocumented migrants in the US would be getting the opportunity to legalise their status. 
Interestingly, points that are also debated, namely the significance of family reunification or 
the problem of visa overstaying, do not expand into proposals for a CIR. The rationale of a 
CIR is to get the approval of all stakeholders by implementing parts of their agenda and 
making ‘package deals’ (Marquez and Witte 2009, 3). Accordingly, actors worried by the 
level of undocumented immigration should be won for the reform by the plan to step up 
border control and internal enforcement. Amnesty on a broad scale could win the consent of 
unions and civil rights groups traditionally concerned with measures protecting people from 
exploitation. Employers’ interest in labour supply is met by the offer of temporary labour 
migration programmes (Freeman 2009, 65-69; Rosenblum 2011, 10-13).  
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In 2012 the slim chance for an agreement on this package deal disappeared in light of the 
economic crisis.
7
 The research on actors that promoted either legalisation of undocumented 
immigrants or temporary labour migration for skilled and unskilled workers felt that they had 
a harder time lobbying for their cause (Interview Chamber of Commerce, National Council of 
la Raza (NCLR) 2012). All collective actors who we have interviewed, regardless of political 
affiliation, see the crisis as a reason for an increasing polarization of opinions in the 
immigration policy area (Interviews US 2012). In particular, those parts of the comprehensive 
immigration reform package were met with resistance that not only debated closure, but also 
legalisation of the undocumented and openness for select groups of migrant workers. 
Concerning the debate, representatives of think tanks leaning to both the left and right 
confirmed that immigration had become a highly politicised topic. A policy advisor from the 
left-leaning think tank, the National Immigration Forum (2012), confirmed, that ʻ[i]t is 
controversial to talk about the idea of foreign born individuals coming to the US when there 
are people here who are struggling to survive, who are native born Americans.ʼ Speaking 
more bluntly, a representative from the conservative Center for Immigration Studies (2012) 
held that ʻpeople do not have jobs, and they see illegal aliens having jobs. And we, as 
Americans, do not have them. So, there are numbers of levels of outrage that have caused 
devastation.ʼ  
In a nutshell, there are a variety of policy ideas on how to reform the US immigration 
system. These address different aspects of the immigration system and are underpinned by 
different ideological positions. Some actors, for instance, consider border enforcement crucial 
to minimise the inflow of undocumented migrants from Mexico. Others, in contrast, hold that 
creating legal paths to immigration, e.g. through guest worker schemes could help addressing 
this issue. Yet another group of stakeholders suggests that the hardship of those already 
staying in the country undocumented should be alleviated through regularisation. The 
presence of policy ideas for reform is an essential prerequisite in Kingdon’s multiple streams 
model. However, these policy ideas need to be taken up by policy-makers in the political 
process.  
In the next section, we will demonstrate that the politics stream was not favourable for 
substantive policy change on the federal level. While the crisis increased pressure for change, 
it further politicised the issue and clearly separated the policy streams from one another. The 
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different stakeholders hence grew even more apart from each other’s positions. Given the 
divisiveness of the topic of immigration, the candidates in the 2012 presidential election did 
not address this issue. A unionist observed: ʻ[P]olitical campaigns avoid the topic like the 
plague. You will see very little about immigration, if anything at all, in the current 
presidential campaign. From the politicians’ standpoint, immigration is just a divisive issue on 
all sidesʼ (Interview AFL-CIO 2012). 
5. The Politics Stream: Why there is deadlock in Congress over immigration reform 
Compromise among actors proved to be impossible since the crisis not only highlighted the 
divisiveness of the positions among actors but also because defection and maintenance of the 
status quo was more beneficial for actors than cooperation. This uncompromising stance in 
combination with institutional constraints in congressional politics reinforced deadlock over 
immigration reform. The US Congress is not only divided on content, but is also blocked 
institutionally. The US political system contains ʻmultiple veto pointsʼ (Rosenblum 2011, 11; 
Hansen 2009, 13): For instance, the presidential veto or the Senate filibuster (Martin 2013; 
Fennelly, Pearson and Hackett 2015, 1424). US bicameralism makes it necessary that both 
chambers agree on a bill for it to become law. In the US system, politicians’ interest 
representation does not necessarily overlap with general party positions. Even though 
Democrats have a broader immigrant constituency than Republicans, leading to a more pro-
immigration and pro-rights attitude (Schain 2006, 386), US politics leave room for very local 
and specific interests (Interview Republican Senator 2012). Positions of politicians in the 
House of Representatives or Senate are defined by the interest of their respective 
constituencies, as well as business, unions, and other groups in these constituencies (Facchini 
and Steinhardt 2011, 735). Thus, it cannot be assumed that Republicans would show a tough 
stance on undocumented migration and call for border enforcement while Democrats would 
all be in favour of immigration and the granting of rights to the undocumented. In fact, 
Republicans that are open to the interests of business in their constituency, for example in the 
agriculture, hotel, and tourism industries, can turn a blind eye on efforts for border 
enforcement against undocumented immigration. Similarly, the Democrats’ assumed liberal 
stance on immigration into the US could be obstructed by organised labour, claiming the 
depression of wages due to immigration (Interview AILA 2012). The interests of the main 
stakeholders, capital and labour, can be decisive in US immigration politics. Their influence 
on political groups can further impede compromise. We interviewed representatives of two 
union umbrella organisations: the AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor and Congress of 
Industrial Organizations) representing 13.5 million workers, and the smaller Change to Win 
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Federation (4.2 million members) which speaks for many Latino workers. Both unions 
strongly support an immigration reform that focuses on the rights of both migrant and native 
workers. The unions’ policies to improve access to rights as well as working conditions 
includes the legalisation of the undocumented, opposition to temporary guest worker 
programmes, and a focus on worksite enforcement instead of border enforcement. For a 
representative of the AFL-CIO, the essence of immigration reform boils down to ʻemployer 
accountabilityʼ (Interview AFL-CIO 2012). If migrant workers are able to claim rights with 
their employer and these rights are enforced at the worksite, exploitation of workers because 
of unfair working conditions can be reduced. Hence, an amnesty for the undocumented is an 
indispensable condition for claiming rights (Interview Change to Win 2012). From the 
interview data it can be deduced that for unions, border enforcement is less of an issue as long 
as illegal employment is contained. The representatives of labour claim that employment 
opportunities for the undocumented create an incentive for crossing the border unauthorised. 
Unions criticise employers for ʻfabricatingʼ labour shortages in order to claim for the 
expansion of temporary worker programmes (Interview AFL-CIO 2012). Those programmes 
are not only said to affect wages negatively (Borjas 2005), but are also said to put the migrant 
worker in a dependent relationship with the employer since the working contract and 
residence status are combined (Interview AFL-CIO 2012). The rights focus of unions, as well 
as an interest in gaining more members, explains their opposition to temporary labour 
migration schemes and their lobby for legalisation. Thus, they would rather keep the status 
quo than compromise their position on temporary labour migration.  
On the employers’ side, the US Chamber of Commerce, which represents the interests 
of 3 million American businesses, considers immigration to be a tool for securing the 
economy’s supply of labour. The focus of employers’ lobbying efforts is on expanding 
temporary worker programmes, for highly as well as lesser skilled migrant workers. In this 
regard, opposition towards the unions’ position is strongest (Interview US Chamber of 
Commerce 2012). The Chamber views measures that improve worksite enforcement of 
immigration and labour law critically, but is not opposed to them. Employers claim a system 
that only applies to new hires leaves room to maintain undocumented employees in their 
workforce. However, this would not mean opposition to legalisation of undocumented 
immigrants. Employers have an interest in a ʻstable workforceʼ. The argument in favour of 
legalisation builds on immigrants’ contribution to the economy and compliance with a set of 
ʻstrict criteriaʼ that would allow undocumented migrants to earn citizenship.8 A steady supply 
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of workers in all sectors fuels production and keeps wages, also for the highly skilled, lower 
(Borjas 2005). Although US employers face strong opposition from unions with regard to 
temporary labour migration programmes, common ground on the issue of legalisation can be 
observed. Therefore, legalisation is the area in which policy output was most likely.  
For the US Chamber of Commerce, immigration is part of the ʻAmerican Fabricʼ which, 
managed in an orderly way, has an overwhelmingly positive impact on the economy and 
society. Whether immigration is still ʻvitally important to the successʼ (National Immigration 
Forum 2012) of the US is questioned by some actors. The position of two lobby groups, 
Numbers USA as well as FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform) show how a 
high level of immigration to the US and suggestions for regulatory reform have become a 
heavily contested issue. The positions of FAIR and Numbers USA would mean a radical 
change to the idea of immigration as being part of the American Fabric. They want to 
substantially lower immigration levels and push strongly for the enforcement angle of the 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform. As a consequence, their influence on policy-makers 
renders compromise on a comprehensive reform package cumbersome since expansion of 
admission for temporary workers and legalisation of undocumented workers are 
fundamentally opposed (Beirich 2009; Tichenor 2014, 43-45).
9
 
Both groups argue that high levels of immigration impact negatively on social justice in 
the US as well as on the environment. The focus of restriction-minded groups on welfare 
systems and social justice can be observed since the 1990s. The framing of immigration as a 
welfare issue replaced a former discourse that racialised the immigration issue (Schain 2006, 
384). They claim that population growth based on immigration has a negative impact on 
wages, the distribution of welfare benefits, as well as the environment in the US. The latter 
point of criticism is based on ʻurban sprawlʼ related to population growth and needs for 
housing. Roy Beck, an environmentalist and founder of Numbers USA, sees the American 
worker with lower skills and lower education being harmed by immigration. Pressure on 
wages particularly in the low-skilled sector would contribute to massive social injustice. At 
the same time, immigrants are blamed for being ʻnet users of government servicesʼ (Interview 
Numbers USA 2012). The same relationship between immigration and local poverty is made 
by FAIR (2012): ʻWe cannot afford to support the impoverished ranks if we continue to keep 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
http://immigration.uschamber.com/uploads/sites/400/Summary%20Immigration%20Priorities%20in%20the%20
House%207-16-2013.pdf, accessed 10 October 2014. 
9
 The pro-immigrant Southern Poverty Law Center accuses FAIR and Numbers USA of pursuing a nativist 
agenda. The Center accounts for the lobby groups’ influence on US immigration politics, in particular the failure 
of the DREAM Act as well as Comprehensive Immigration Reform. http://www.splcenter.org/get-
informed/publications/the-nativist-lobby-three-faces-of-intolerance, accessed 15 June 2015 
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bringing in more and more. We do have a responsibility to the people of the US who are poor 
or do not have health insurance.ʼ Concerning the economic crisis, it is criticised that 
immigration policy does not respond to changes in supply and demand for workers on the 
labour market. ʻWe are admitting the same number of people now our unemployment is over 
8 per cent, as we did when it was under 5 per cent. […] how do we fix the immigration 
system that addresses the needs we have in this country?ʼ (Interview FAIR 2012). Both 
groups aim for ʻpopulation stabilityʼ, i.e. the end of population growth induced by 
immigration. This would entail the reduction of immigration to one-quarter of its current size 
of one million admissions per year. In order to achieve this threshold, the green card and 
diversity lotteries would be abolished, family-based migration would be reduced to spouses 
and children only, and border and worksite enforcement would be increased. Immigration 
would not be stopped, because in terms of labour migration, a strict focus on immigration of 
the highly skilled is claimed. According to their own evaluation, FAIR and Numbers USA 
were successful in lobbying Congress against legalisation of the undocumented (Beirich 2009, 
12, 18; Interview FAIR and Numbers USA 2012). Both lobby groups consider the status quo 
in US immigration regulation, which currently allows a million people each year to 
immigrate, to benefit the parties’ families and business interests. Allegedly, immigration 
policy change should not be expected from Congress since immigrants are likely to increase 
the Democrats’ electorate and Republicans please their ʻbackboneʼ, the industry and business 
with a steady supply of labour (Interview Numbers USA 2012).  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 provides information on interest groups and their objectives in a CIR. Points at the 
outer side of the triangle indicate support of i.e. stricter enforcement measures, while points in 
the centre show interest group position against this part of CIR. As explained above, 
stakeholders’ and interest groups’ positions are extremely divisive on the issue. On the one 
hand, the Latino civil rights organization NCLR and the labour union AFL-CIO support an 
amnesty for unauthorised immigrants already residing in the US, while being opposed to 
extended enforcement. Their liberal position is partly supported by the US Chamber of 
Commerce. They, however, strongly favour temporary labour migration programmes that are 
not supported by the unions. On the other side of the ʻideological (…) divideʼ (Marquez and 
Witte 2009, 20), the nativist organizations FAIR and Numbers USA are opposed to any part 
of CIR except extended enforcement. Following the deadlock game in game theory, defection 
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is indeed more beneficial than cooperation, as currently none of the actors want to 
compromise their position on: the increase in labour force (employers), no temporary labour 
migration policy (unions), and stepping up in enforcement (nativists).  
Studying actors’ divisiveness over a comprehensive immigration reform, Martin (2011a, 
25) holds that the status quo ʻis the second-best option for those who cannot achieve their 
first-choice solutionʼ as ʻmost unauthorised migrants get the higher wage jobs they seek and 
most employers get work done cheaper with such migrantsʼ (Martin 2011a, 17)10. Therefore, 
he observes ʻtalk but no actionʼ (Martin 2011a, 32) in times of crisis. We contest this 
argument and show in the next sections how actors searched for alternative venues to bring 
about change in immigration policy. 
 
6. In Search of New Venues: Immigration control at the state level and executive 
orders by the president 
The politics stream impeded change on the federal level due to the institutional setting and the 
divisiveness of actor positions which were emphasised by the crisis. Yet the problem stream 
became more prominent in recent years, especially but not only through the crisis and 
highlighted the need for policy change. This pressure hence led stakeholders to look for other 
venues to pursue their policy aims in which they would face fewer veto players. 
Therefore, we find the claim that US politics were completely unable to produce 
legislative change to be slightly inaccurate. Change can be observed, albeit not on the federal 
level. Immigration policy-making shifts to the US states as well as to the president (Varsanyi 
2010)
11
. Against the procedural rules that are laid down in the Constitution, the ʻstates take 
immigration into their own handsʼ (Interview Immigration Policy Center 2012). Such policy 
devolution can be observed in southern US states most affected by undocumented border 
crossers. Recent anti-immigrant legislation in Arizona and Alabama that aims against 
undocumented immigrants’ access to government services, such as education or 
infrastructure, have caused concern among policy observers (Boyer 2012, 1). Not only are 
states overstepping their competencies in this field, state legislation is overwhelmingly 
targeted at undocumented immigrants, of whom many happen to be Latinos, causing fear of a 
backlash against workers from Mexico or Central America (Interview National Immigration 
                                                          
10
 A similar explanation for the inability reform is put forward by Hanson (2009). 
11
 A minor exemption is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 which entailed 
restrictions on the H-1B visa program for companies that received funds through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP). However, the legislation only affected a small number of enterprises mainly in the banking 
sector and expired in 2011. 
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Forum 2012). In addition, anti-immigrant ordinances issued by municipalities (local level) are 
constantly on the rise since the failures of Comprehensive Immigration Reform (Steil and 
Vasi 2014, 1110; Varsanyi 2010, 11; Gilbert 2009).  
Since the late nineteenth century, immigration policy-making has laid in the hands of 
the federal government. Only recently ʻstate and local immigration policy activism has 
explodedʼ (Varsanyi 2010, 9). This devolution was made possible by the 104th Congress 
under Republican majority through three aforementioned legislative acts that passed Congress 
in 1996: the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Illegal Immigration Reform 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Varsanyi 2010, 2).
12
 However, state and local actors 
did not use these newly created channels immediately at the time of establishment (Varsanyi 
2010). Varsanyi (2010, 11) argues that politicians became more active on the state and local 
levels to ʻearn political capital on the issue of immigration reformʼ. Only the repeated failures 
to reform the immigration system ʻopened a veritable Pandora’s Box of state and local 
immigration control initiatives seeking to fill the policy voidʼ (Cornelius 2010: vii). Case in 
points are the 287(g) agreements between the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
agencies (ICE) and local enforcement partners (police), which are by now in place in 17 states 
(ICE 2014; Coleman 2012), municipalities and city ordinances (Steil and Vasi 2014; Varsanyi 
2008). In terms of party politics, scholars showed that Republicans are critical of the 
effectiveness of federal measures for immigration enforcement and push for devolution to the 
state level. In contrast, Democrats are opposed to state government attempts to take on 
immigration enforcement (Jones and Chou 2014; Fennelly, Pearson and Hackett 2015, 1423).  
Another example for a shift in venues are executive orders adopted by the president. 
These orders supersede majorities in the Congress and again highlight the inability of 
Congress to legislate. The DREAM Act, which would have legalised the status of young 
deserving undocumented migrants who had come as children, did not gain a majority in the 
Senate. Republican Senators blocked the bill in 2010. By executive order, President Obama 
bypassed approval of the Congress allowing for deferred action, abolishing execution of 
deportation for this specific group in August 2012. Among others, requirements for 
qualification are that undocumented youth must have no criminal record and pursue either 
military service or higher education. Legalisation was conditioned upon their ‘deservingness’. 
                                                          
12
 In fact, these restrictions can be seen as the results of earlier venue shopping. Judicially inhibited restrictions 
on access of the undocumented to public goods in California (Proposition 187) influenced immigration control 
legislation in the US Senate and the creation of legal options for devolution. In the early 1990s, economic crisis, 
recession and unemployment put pressure on state politicians to act against undocumented immigrants (Schain 
2006, 383-384).  
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The justification for the original bill was not only based on moral grounds such as fairness; 
the group in question was brought to the country by their parents and thus had not broken 
immigration law intentionally. Additionally, the White House referred to the economic crisis 
and the positive budgetary implications that legalisation of this group would entail: ʻPresident 
Obama believes that […] an important part of rebuilding our economy [...] is making our 
immigration system functional, efficient, and accountable
 13
 Economic and security needs 
justified pressing for passage of comprehensive immigration reform as well as the DREAM 
Act. It was calculated that passing the DREAM Act would bring $2.2 billion revenue over ten 
years.
14
 The executive order was not only the adoption of a first piece of the deadlocked 
comprehensive immigration reform, but was also framed as a response to the crisis. In that 
sense, not only could venue shopping be observed, but also the intersection of policy, problem 
and politics streams. The executive order offered a new political venue for decision-making. 
The unresolved problem of the undocumented immigrant population gained fiscal urgency 
during the crisis and met with a policy that had been debated for some time already. Some 
actors claimed their lobbying efforts of the Obama administration for this executive order 
(Change to Win, NCLR 2012). The unions, civil rights groups and organisations that 
represent Latino interests welcomed the president’s initiative as a first step for large scale 
legalisation (ACLU, AFL-CIO, Change to Win, NCLR 2012). Others criticised that the 
executive order bypassed Congress in order to win the vote of the Latino community in the 
election year (Republican Senator, FAIR 2012). And restrictively-minded groups feared that 
deferred action allowing for the DREAM Act to be executed would be the wedge for CIR 
(FAIR 2012).  
State legislation on immigration, as well as executive orders, indicate a shift in venues 
for immigration policy-making. Enforcement is decided on the state level and legalisation of 
the undocumented is executed by bypassing a Congressional majority. Among the suggested 
policies that are part of a CIR, unions and employers would only agree on legalisation. 
Enforcement was not on their agenda and the temporary immigration of workers was heavily 
contested. Accordingly, the president maintained the status quo and opted for a piecemeal 
approach on legalisation. Observers from the left deemed this approach as the only way 
forward in a deadlocked Congress (Interview Change to Win, AFL-CIO, AILA, ACLU 2012).  
                                                          
13
 See the agenda of the White House for the Hispanic community from 2012: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/hispanic_agenda_final.pdf, accessed 8 July 2015. 
14
 For the details of the programme, see the website of the Department of Homeland Security: 
http://www.dhs.gov/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals, accessed 8 July 2015. 
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In sum, the absence of policy change on the federal level intensified the problem stream, 
especially in times of economic crisis. Pressures for change therefore made their way to other 
venues. Republicans were able to enforce restrictive measures on border protection via the 
state and local levels, whereas Democrats could implement legalisation schemes through 
presidential decrees. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper set out to answer the question of what the impact of the economic and financial 
crisis is on immigration policies in the United States, a country that has been hit hard by this 
crisis. We find that the crisis has highlighted policy problems that have been present before 
and has aggravated these problems. US immigration policies have been described as ʻbad for 
migrants, employers and the national interestʼ (Martin 2011a, 24). Yet, a CIR is stuck in 
Congress given the absence of strong majorities and the divergent preferences between, but 
also among, Republicans and Democrats. Policy ideas for liberal and restrictive change have 
been present for a long time. Moreover, the problem stream is aggravating. In addition the 
increasing problems of unauthorised border crossings in combination with the hardship of 
people who have no access to any rights at all based on their undocumented status, motivate 
both policy proponents of liberalisation and restriction to look for alternative venues to pursue 
their policy aims. Republicans, who hold the majorities in most state legislatures, pass 
restrictive policies on the state level where they do not encounter liberal veto players. As far 
as the Democrats are concerned, the presidential decrees, e.g. the deferred action on childhood 
arrivals from 2012 and others passed by President Barack Obama in 2014, can equally be 
considered as an attempt to shop for policy venues where no restrictive veto players can be 
found (Migration Policy Institute 2014).  
The contribution of this article is twofold. On the one hand, we have theorised the 
current situations of deadlock on the CIR and policy change on the state levels, which have 
been widely discussed but so far not comprehensively explained. We demonstrate that 
combining the theoretical approaches of venue-shopping and multiple streams is particularly 
helpful to understand policy-making under deadlock, as the problem and policy streams 
would call for change but the politics stream impedes it and so actors search for other venues 
to pursue their policy aims. This also applies to other policy areas on which the US Congress 
is currently faced with deadlock. In the case of the EU others have argued that restrictively-
minded ministers of the interior have engaged in ‘bottom-up’ venue-shopping, i.e. they have 
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changed from the national to the EU level to pursue their policy aims (Guiraudon 2000; 
Maurer and Parkes 2007). Our study adds to this that venue-shopping is not a one-way 
process, but can also imply ‘top-down’ venue-shopping and a search for adequate venues on a 
lower, i.e. subnational level. This seems to be part of a larger phenomenon. Examples for a 
trend towards devolution of immigration control and enforcement to subnational venues can 
be found in other federal political systems. More competences for local and regional entities 
are also claimed in Canada, Spain, the UK, and other countries (Thränhardt 2013). In which 
way the economic crisis intensified claims for devolution in other cases has yet to be 
researched.    
On the other hand, we show that the crisis has rather aggravated or highlighted 
problems that have been present for a long time. Thus, the crisis cannot be considered to be 
the root of current policy change, but rather a moderating variable amplifying the problem 
pressure that entailed change. This leads us to conclude that external shocks like the global 
economic crisis never have an immediate impact and are never critical junctures per se but 
that these rather need to be translated into policy change by political actors. 
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Interest group Admission Enforcement Amnesty 
 Permanent legal immigration  
= Family 
Economic migration 
 
Temporary workers 
More intense 
border control, 
apprehension and 
deportation, local 
enforcement by 
states 
E-verify 
“employer 
verification”
1
 
Legalisation, 
DREAM Act 
(DACA, deferred 
action for childhood 
arrivals) 
AFL-CIO  
 
Yes 
Labour immigration should strictly work 
on labour shortages 
No No Yes Yes 
Change to Win 
 
Yes 
= permanent legal immigration 
No No No Yes 
Chamber of 
Commerce 
Yes, but shift focus 
to employment 
Yes, reduce per 
country caps, first 
come first serve 
based on skills 
Yes 
No 
Borders need to be 
secure but not 
sealed 
Yes and No 
More critical than 
supportive 
System should work 
in a manageable 
way 
Yes 
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Interest group Admission Enforcement Amnesty 
Numbers US 
Yes, for spouses and minor 
children, no chain migration 
Lower ceilings, open to skilled, 
cut the diversity and green card 
lottery 
Yes Yes No 
FAIR 
Lower ceilings overall, focus on skills 
Yes Yes No 
AILA 
Yes 
Family migration as well as 
economic migration is 
supported 
Yes 
Facilitations for temporary 
worker programmes are 
demanded 
No increase in 
control  
No 
E-verify is flawed 
and puts a burden 
on businesses 
Yes 
National 
Immigration Forum 
Yes on all issues 
No 
Further 
enforcement, 
control intensity 
and costs are too 
high already 
No 
Do not punish 
workers for an 
immigration system 
that does not work 
Yes 
Center for 
Immigration Studies 
Lower ceilings 
Saturation point reached with immigration 
Get rid of family unity 
Focus on people 
who can help the 
economy get going 
again 
Yes 
Yes 
Keep undocumented 
immigrants from 
being hired 
 
 
 
 
No 
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Interest group Admission Enforcement Amnesty 
ACLU 
Yes 
Family reunification 
is a human right 
Not really their 
focus, but 
Yes 
Not really their 
focus, but 
Yes 
For skilled and 
unskilled 
No  
More intensification, 
against state level 
immigration control 
No 
Concerns about 
privacy and accuracy 
of the system 
Yes 
National Council of 
la Raza 
Yes 
In favour of family 
reunification 
Not really their 
focus, but  
Yes 
Permanent labour 
migration better 
than temporary 
Yes 
Particularly for 
seasonal workers 
No 
Against states 
enforcing 
immigration law 
Against further 
intensification of 
control 
No 
Will hurt Latino 
workers and Latino 
small businesses 
Yes 
1 
Employer verification systems are used to check workers’ employment eligibility (now referred to as E-Verify) (see Rosenblum 2011: 6). 
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Table 2. Institutional affiliation of interviewees 
Institutional affiliations of US interviewees Date of Interview 
 Washington D.C. 
American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) 11 September 2012 
Immigration Policy Center 11 September 2012 
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) 11 September 2012 
15 October 2012 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) 12 September 2012 
US Chamber of Commerce 13 September 2012 
Numbers USA 13 September 2012 
Change to Win 14 September 2012 
Republican Senator 17 September 2012 
National Immigration Forum 17 September 2012 
Center for Immigration Studies 18 September 2012 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 18 September 2012 
National Council of La Raza (NCLR) 19 September 2012 
 
